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OF MINORITY REPRESENTATION, MULTIPLE-
RACE RESPONSES, AND MELTING POTS:
REDISTRICTING IN THE NEW AMERICA
MELISSA L. SAUNDERS*
For years, Robinson Everett has waged war on the gerrymander.'
In his early campaigns, he battled gerrymanders of the partisan
variety.2 More recently, he has trained his sights on a different breed
of gerrymander-the racial gerrymander.3  He is particularly
bothered by the kind of racial gerrymander that is designed to give a
racial minority a majority in one or more districts4 the kind that
Professor Butler has dubbed the "affirmative" racial gerrymander.'
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. I thank John
Calmore, Bob Saunders, and Marilyn Yarborough for comments, and Ryan Blaine for
research assistance. In the interest of full disclosure, I note that I have participated in
several cases involving the issues raised by Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), and its
progeny, including Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999) (Cromartie 1); and Easley v.
Cromartie, 121 S. Ct. 1452 (2001) (Cromartie 11).
1. Like Everett, I use the term "gerrymander" to mean a legislative districting plan
in which the district lines are drawn so as to ensure particular electoral outcomes.
2. Robinson 0. Everett, Redistricting in North Carolina-A Personal Perspective, 79
N.C. L. REV. 1301, 1304-05 (2001) (discussing his participation in the Drum litigation in
the 1960s).
3. See id. at 1310-31 (discussing his participation in the Shaw and Cromartie
litigation of the last decade).
4. As Everett recognizes, this kind of racial gerrymander is often undertaken with
partisan objectives in mind, as well as racial ones. For example, he attributes the United
States Department of Justice's (DOJ or "Justice") insistence on the "maximization" of
black political power in the early 1990s to the Republican Party's desire to maximize the
number of seats that it controlled in Congress. See id. at 1307 & n.39. Additionally, he
attributes the odd shape of the 12th Congressional District in North Carolina's 1991 plan
to the Democratic Party's desire to comply with Justice's command to create a second
black district without sacrificing the number of seats that it controlled in the state's
congressional delegation. See id. at 1309-10. It is precisely this difficulty that has made
the "race [as] the predominant factor" test of Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995),
so difficult to apply.
5. See Katharine Inglis Butler, Affirmative Racial Gerrymandering: Fair
Representation for Minorities or a Dangerous Recognition of Group Rights?, 26 RUTGERS
L.J. 595 (1995); Katharine Inglis Butler, Affirmative Racial Gerrymandering: Rhetoric and
Reality, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 313 (1995-96). The adjective "affirmative" is apparently
designed both to suggest that the practice is said to have the "benign" objective of helping
to give the gerrymandered minority a greater voice in the political process, and to link it
with so-called "affirmative action" in hiring, government contracting, and college
admissions.
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In his view, this sort of gerrymander is especially pernicious, because
it stimulates public awareness of race, reinforces common stereotypes
about the correlation between race and political interest, discourages
the building of interracial coalitions, and fans the flames of racial
division.6 In this respect, he is not alone; many Americans share his
concerns.
7
Over the years, Everett has developed a keen awareness of the
limits of litigation as a means of containing the threat of
gerrymandering. He notes that while the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Constitution as imposing some limits on partisan
gerrymandering,8 those limits have been difficult to enforce in the
courts.9 And he fears that the same may ultimately prove true for
racial gerrymandering."
Frustrated with his efforts to get the courts to put a stop to racial
gerrymandering, Everett now proposes to try a different tactic: to
shift responsibility for redistricting from the state legislature to an
independent redistricting commission. This commission would be
prohibited by state law from considering race in drawing district lines,
"except to the extent required by federal law."'" Because of the
danger "that racial gerrymandering will be disguised as partisan
gerrymandering," he would also forbid the commission to consider
partisan political data, such as voter registration and election results. 2
And because incumbency protection may be used to justify allowing
representatives who were first elected from racially-gerrymandered
districts to "retain the[] spoils" of their (apparently illicit) victories,
he would forbid the commission to consider incumbency as a factor. 3
6. See Everett, supra note 2, at 1311-13.
7. For similar expressions of concern about the social and political effect of this kind
of gerrymander, see Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 905 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring,
joined by Scalia, J.); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647-48 (1993) (O'Connor, J.); United
Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 172-74 (1977)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 67 (1964) (Douglas,
J., dissenting); ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? 242-43 (1987).
8. See Everett, supra note 2, at 1306 (citing Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143
(1986)).
9. See Everett, supra note 2, at 1305 (describing the "frustrating outcome" of the
Drum litigation in North Carolina); id. at 1306 (noting that the plaintiffs in Davis v.
Bandemer were "den[ied] relief" from the courts other than "recogniz[ing] the possibility"
of an equal protection violation for those who would engage in partisan gerrymandering in
the future); id at 1309 (noting that a partisan gerrymandering challenge to North
Carolina's 1992 congressional districting plan proved unsuccessful).
10. Id. at 1314, 1326-27.
11. Id. at 1329-31.




Finally, he would require the commission to comply with certain
"traditional neutral districting principles," like contiguity,
compactness, and respect for the boundaries of cities, counties, and
political subdivisions, in drawing district lines.1
4
In this brief commentary, I address Everett's proposed solution
to the problem of racial gerrymandering and explain why I find it
unsatisfying. I also explain why I think the current legal and political
solution to the problem of minority representation in this country will
become increasingly unworkable in this new century. I conclude with
some brief thoughts on where I think we may be headed in this area.
I.
I share some of Everett's concerns about racial gerrymandering,
at least in the extreme forms we saw in the early 1990s.15 But his
proposed solution to the problem strikes me as unsatisfactory, for at
least two reasons.
First, it fails to account for the significant social and political
pressures to produce a set of district lines that is fair to all relevant
interest groups, including those that define themselves by race. Like
it or not, racial minorities in today's America often see themselves-
rightly or wrongly-as having distinct political interests. As long as
they do so, they will pressure redistricting authorities to be fair to
them, just as other interest groups-farmers, bankers, and suburban
Republicans-do. Shifting responsibility for redistricting from the
state legislatures to independent commissions won't remove this
pressure; it will just redirect it.'6 And telling the commissions they
can't consider race in drawing lines "except to the extent required by
federal law"' 7 won't prevent that pressure from influencing state
districting choices; it will just obscure its influence from public view.
Second, Everett's proposal fails to account for the fact that
amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles,'8 exerts substantial pressure
on the states to gerrymander along racial lines. Shifting responsibility
for redistricting from the state legislatures to independent
14. Id.
15. For further discussion, see Melissa L. Saunders, Reconsidering Shaw: The
Miranda of Race-Conscious Districting, 109 YALE L.J. 1603, 1605 & n.15 (2000).
16. In addition, it will open a new front in the battle for political influence, as racial
and ethnic minorities attempt to ensure that they are fairly represented on the
commissions themselves.
17. See Everett, supra note 2, at 1329.
18. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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commissions won't remove this pressure; as arms of the state, the
commissions will still be obligated to comply with the Voting Rights
Act, just as the state legislatures are.19 And telling the commissions
that they can't consider race in drawing lines "except to the extent
required by federal law"' won't relieve them from that obligation; it
will merely serve to remind them of it.
In short, Everett's proposal won't rid us of racial
gerrymandering, because it won't rid us of the powerful pressures-
social, political, and legal-that are leading redistricting authorities to
engage in it.
II.
As states, whether through independent commissions or the
legislative process, attempt to comply with amended section 2 in the
next round, they will encounter a number of difficulties. One obvious
problem will be how to adjust the section 2 analysis to account for
increasing racial and ethnic diversity. The current framework for
analyzing a section 2 claim, set forth in the Gingles decision,2 was
designed for a jurisdiction with a very specific demographic profile: a
19. The fact that a plan is drawn by an independent commission, rather than a
legislature, does not make it immune from challenge under the Voting Rights Act, as
many states discovered in the last round of redistricting. See, e.g., Old Person v. Cooney,
230 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2000) (section 2 challenge to Montana's 1992 plan for state
legislative districts, which was drawn by an independent commission); Quilter v.
Voinovich, 794 F. Supp. 756 (N.D. Ohio 1992) (section 2 challenge to Ohio's 1991 plan for
state legislative districts, which was drawn by an independent apportionment board),
rev'd, 507 U.S. 146 (1993). A commission-drawn plan may, however, be more likely to
survive a Shaw challenge than a legislative-drawn plan. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF,
PAMELA S. KARLAN, & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL
STRUCrURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 608 (1998) (noting that the only plans the
Supreme Court has ever upheld against Shaw challenge have been drawn either by courts
or by non-partisan commissions, rather than by legislatures); Samuel Issacharoff, The
Constitutional Contours of Race and Politics, 1995 SUP. Cr. REV. 45, 66-68 (arguing that
the Court seems less skeptical of race-conscious districting when it is done by non-partisan
commissions than by legislative bodies); Jeffrey C. Kubin, Note, The Case for Redistricting
Commissions, 75 TEX. L. REV. 837,861-72 (1997) (same).
20. See Everett, supra note 2, at 1329.
21. In Gingles, the Court held that to make out a prima facie case that a multi-
member districting plan violates its rights under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, a
minority group must establish: (i) that it is "sufficiently large and geographically compact
to constitute a majority in a single-member district" drawn within the challenged multi-
member district; (ii) that it is "politically cohesive"; and (iii) that "the white majority votes
sufficient as a bloc to enable it-in the absence of special circumstances, such as the
minority candidate running unopposed-usually to defeat the minority's preferred
candidate." 478 U.S. at 50-51. In the early 1990s, the Court held that the same three
prerequisites were necessary to establish a prima facie case of vote dilution with respect to
a single-member district. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 37-42 (1993).
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white majority with a substantial black minority and no other
protected minority of any significant size. In that particular setting,
the Gingles framework does a fairly decent job of answering the
ultimate question under section 2: whether the challenged electoral
structure causes the members of the plaintiff minority group to have
"less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate
in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice."'
But extend this framework to a jurisdiction with a different
demographic profile-particularly one with two or more protected
minority groups of substantial size-and it quickly proves
unsatisfactory.
Suppose, for example, that the jurisdiction contains two or more
protected minority groups, each of which has been the victim of past
official discrimination, both inside and outside the electoral process.
Each of these groups is able to draw a proposed plan that would give
it more "safe" districts than it has under the challenged plan. Each is
able to show that, in majority-white districts, bloc voting by the white
majority usually results in the defeat of the group's preferred
candidates. Each is able to establish the existence of a number of the
other "Senate factors. ' And each is able to show that the challenged
plan does not allow it to control a number of seats that is roughly
proportionate to its numerical strength. It is, however, impossible for
the jurisdiction to comply with the demands of each group: if it draws
extra "safe" districts for one group, it will not be able to do so for
others. If these competing minority groups sue under section 2, what
would be the result? 24
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994). Even in such a jurisdiction, the Gingles analysis can
present difficulties. That analysis was developed for what Samuel Issacharoff calls
"classical" claims of racial vote dilution-challenges to at-large electoral systems brought by
black voters in predominantly white jurisdictions where blacks had not been elected to
office since the fall of Reconstruction. See Samuel Issacharoff, Groups and the Right to
Vote, 44 EMORY L.J. 869, 879-80 (1995). In that context, the dilutive effect of the
challenged electoral system was so extreme as to be functionally equivalent to outright
exclusion, and courts could declare it invalid under section 2 without having to decide
what the "undiluted" strength of the black vote would have been. Id. But once section 2
litigation progressed beyond this sort of claim to the kind we saw in the 1990s-a
challenge to the lines of a single-member districting scheme, brought by a minority group
that was able to win some seats under it-it proved increasingly problematic. See id.
(citing Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994)).
23. The reference is to the factors that a Senate Committee Report accompanying the
bill that amended section 2 lists as being probative of a violation of the amended
provision. See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,
206-07. In Gingles and its progeny, the Court has directed courts to consider these factors
in adjudicating claims under amended section 2. See, e.g., De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1009-17;
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48-52 & n.15.
24. This situation differs in one critical respect from that which the Court confronted
13712001]
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Or suppose the jurisdiction contains two or more protected
minority groups, each of which has been the victim of past official
discrimination, both inside and outside the electoral process. Neither
of them is able to draw a proposed plan that would give it more
"safe" districts than the challenged plan, because neither is large
enough to constitute a majority in another district. But they can show
that it is possible to reconfigure the lines so as to create an additional
"majority-minority" district, which the two of them could control by
combining forces. If the competing minority groups sue together
under section 2, what would be the result?15
Or suppose the jurisdiction is so racially and ethnically diverse
that no racial or ethnic group-not even non-Hispanic whites-has a
majority. In such a jurisdiction, which demographer William Frey
calls a "melting pot" jurisdiction, 6 the inquiry that lies at the
conceptual heart of the Gingles analysis-the inquiry into "racially
polarized voting"2 -is incoherent. How can one speak coherently of
a majority that is voting as a bloc along racial lines2' when that
majority consists of two or more different racial or ethnic groups?
How can one speak sensibly of racially polarized voting when the
relevant majorities and minorities are themselves shifting coalitions of
different racial and ethnic groups?
In the last round of redistricting, these difficulties with the
in Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994). In De Grandy, the challenged plan
afforded each of the two competing minority groups "effective voting majorities" in a
number of districts that were substantially "proportional to [their share] in the voting-age
population." 512 U.S. at 1000. Here, by contrast, the challenged plan does not offer either
of them that sort of "proportionality." The only way to accommodate the claims of both
groups would be to expand the number of seats, which the Court has held that section 2
does not require a jurisdiction to do. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994).
25. For examples of courts wrestling with the Gingles analysis in this context, see, for
example, Nixon v. Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Badillo v. City of
Stockton, 956 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1992); Concerned Citizens v. Hardee County Bd. of
Comm'rs, 906 F.2d 524 (11th Cir. 1990); Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240 (5th
Cir. 1988); Knox v. Milwaukee County Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 607 F. Supp. 1112 (E.D.
Wis. 1985). For more on these "coalition" lawsuits, see Katharine I. Butler & Richard
Murray, Minority Vote Dilution Suits and the Problem of Two Minority Groups: Can a
"Rainbow Coalition" Claim the Protection of the Voting Rights Act?, 21 PAC. L.J. 619
(1990); Sebastian Geraci, Comment, The Case Against Allowing Multiracial Coalitions to
File Section 2 Dilution Claims, 1995 U. CmI. LEGAL F. 389 (1995); Aylon M. Schulte, Note,
Minority Aggregation Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Toward Just
Representation in Ethnically Diverse Communities, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 441 (1995).
26. See William H. Frey, Regional Shifts in America's Voting-Aged Population: What
Do They Mean for National Politics?, Research Report No. 00-459, POPULATION
STUDIES CENTER, October 2000, at 1, available at http://www.frey-demographer.org/
reports/rrOO-459.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
27. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,54-61 (1986).
28. See id. at 51.
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Gingles analysis were already rearing their ugly heads in jurisdictions
whose demographic profiles did not fit the Gingles paradigm.2 9 In the
upcoming round, they will arise more frequently. States like
California, Texas, and Florida,30 which did not fit the Gingles profile
the last time around, are now even more racially and ethnically
diverse.3' And even in states that have remained majority-white
overall, immigration, migration, and differential birth rates have
transformed some political subdivisions that once fit the Gingles
profile into the sort of "melting pot" jurisdiction that does not.32
The format of the 2000 census data will exacerbate these
difficulties with the Gingles analysis. In it, individuals were, for the
first time, allowed to identify themselves as members of more than
one racial category3 3  There were six basic racial categories:
"American Indian or Alaska Native," "Asian," "Black or African
American," "Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander," "White,"
and "Some Other Race." 4  There are sixty-three possible
combinations of these basic racial categories: six for those who report
only one race, and fifty-seven for those who report two or more
races.35  In the data that it has provided to state and local
29. See, e.g., Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994) (state of Florida); Nixon v.
Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Kent County, Michigan).
30. See Frey, supra note 25, at 1.
31. See id.
32. In North Carolina, for example, a number of counties that once fit the Gingles
profile no longer do because of their growing Hispanic populations. See Ned Glascoke,
Estimate Alarms Hispanic Advocates, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 21, 1997,
at B1; James Rosen, Adding to the Ethnic Mix, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept.
4,1998, at Al. Early data from the 2000 census puts North Carolina's Hispanic population
at 378,963. See U.S. Census Bureau, at http://factfinder.census.gov (last visited May 14,
2001) (providing 2000 census data for North Carolina on Race, Hispanic or Latino, and
Age) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). In 1990, this population was only
77,000. Id. (providing 1990 census data for North Carolina on General Population and
Housing Characteristics). For a county by county breakdown, see id. (providing 2000
census data for North Carolina on Race and Hispanic or Latino).
33. See U.S. Census Bureau, Racial and Ethnic Classifications Used in Census 2000
and Beyond, http://www.census.gov:8Opopulationlwww/socdemo/race/racefactcb.html
(last revised Apr. 12, 2000) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter
U.S. Census Bureau, Racial and Ethnic Classifications]. The Census Bureau decided to
offer this option in response to pressure from groups representing mixed-race couples. See
D'vera Cohn, A Racial Tug of War Over Census: New Option Fosters Group Competition,
WASH. POST., Mar. 3, 2000, at B1. Nearly 7 million people (about 2.4% of the
respondents) selected more than one racial category in their responses. See D'vera Cohn
& Darryl Fears, Multiracial Growth Seen In Census: Numbers Show Diversity, Complexity
of U.S. Count, WASH. POST., Mar. 13, 2001, at Al. While the overwhelming majority of
those marked only two racial categories, some marked three or more. See id.
34. U.S. Census Bureau, Racial and Ethnic Classifications, supra note 33.
35. Id.
2001] 1373
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governments for redistricting,36 the Census Bureau has included
numerical distributions for all sixty-three racial categories,37
cross-tabulated with the two ethnicity categories.3 8  To apply the
Gingles analysis in the next round of redistricting, courts will have to
decide what to do with these multi-race responses.
We already know how the United States Department of Justice
(DOJ) will deal with multi-race responses for purposes of
preclearance under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act:39 It will follow
the allocation rules laid down by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) in March 2000.40 Pursuant to those rules, DOJ will
allocate any multiple-race response in which "White" and one of the
five other basic categories were checked to the minority race that was
checked.4' Thus, the numbers for each minority race will consist of
the total of (i) the single-race responses in which only that minority
race was checked; and (ii) the multiple-race responses in which only
that minority race and "White" were checked.4' DOJ will allocate the
remaining multiple-race responses-those in which two or more
minority races were checked, either along with "White" or without
it-to a category called "Other Multiple-Race."43  If it finds that a
jurisdiction's "Other Multiple-Race" category contains a significant
number of responses that reflect a particular multiple-race
combination, it will allocate those responses alternatively to each of
the minority races in that combination.4 Thus, if it finds that the
"White," "Black or African-American," and "Asian" combination
36. This data is contained in a file known as the "PL 94-171 Redistricting File," after
the federal law that requires the Census Bureau to provide it to the states within one year
of Census Day. See PUB. L. 94-171, 89 Stat. 1023 (1975) (codified as amended at 13
U.S.C. § 141 (2000)). The PL 94-171 redistricting data from the 2000 census was made
available to the states on or before April 1, 2001.
37. See U.S. Census Bureau, Racial and Ethnic Classifications, supra note 33.
38. See id. Like its predecessors, the 2000 census also asked individuals to identify
themselves as belonging to one of two "ethnicity" categories: "Hispanic or Latino" and
"not Hispanic or Latino." Id. Unlike its predecessors, however, the 2000 census asked the
ethnicity question before the race question, to reflect the fact that in the federal statistical
system, "Hispanic or Latino" is not considered to be a "race." Id.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
40. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BULLETIN No. 00-02,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/OMBbulletinsbOO-02.html (Mar. 9, 2000) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
41. See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Guidance Concerning Redistricting and Retrogression, 66
Fed. Reg. 5412, 5414 (Jan. 18, 2001). The intent here is, presumably, to prevent the new







has a significant number of responses, it will allocate the first of those
responses to the "Black or African-American" category, the second
to the "Asian" category, the third to the "Black or African-
American" category, and so on.45 As in the past, DOJ will treat
"Hispanic or Latino" as a separate minority group for purposes of
enforcing the Voting Rights Act.46 If it finds that a significant number
of the individuals in the jurisdiction have identified themselves as
members of this ethnic category and one or more minority races, it
will allocate those responses alternatively to the "Hispanic or Latino"
category and the minority race(s) checked.47 Thus, if it finds that a
significant number of responses checked both "Hispanic or Latino"
and "Black or African-American," it will allocate the first of those
responses to the "Hispanic or Latino" category, the second to the
"Black or African-American" category, and so on.
48
DOJ will also have to use the OMB allocation rules in enforcing
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.49 Presumably, it will also adhere
to the refinements on those rules that it has developed for use in the
section 5 preclearance process. But what about the courts? When
they are asked to apply section 2 in this round-in section 2 suits
brought by either DOJ or private litigants, or in Shaw suits brought to
attack plans that include majority-minority districts drawn to comply
with section 2-what will they do? As a formal matter, they are not
bound by either the OMB's allocation rules 0 or the DOJ's
refinements on those rules.5 Will they follow the executive branch's
lead here? This seems unlikely, given DOJ's recent track record in





49. Section 12 of the Voting Rights Act authorizes the DOJ to bring suit to enforce
the provisions of section 2. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973j(d) (1994). Members of protected
minority groups may also bring section 2 suits on their own behalf. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973a
(1994); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544,557 (1969).
50. See Nathaniel Persily, Color by Numbers: Race, Redistricting, and the 2000
Census, 85 MINN. L. REv. 899, 936 n.141 (2001) (noting that the OMB's allocation rules
apply only to federal agencies that are charged with enforcing the federal civil rights laws).
51. See U.S. Dept. of Justice, supra note 40, at 5412 ("This guidance is not legally
binding," but is "intended only to provide assistance to entities and persons affected by
the preclearance requirements of section 5.").
52. See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471 (1997) (striking down DOJ
regulation interpreting section 5 as requiring it to deny preclearance to a plan that the
DOJ thinks would violate section 2); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (rejecting
DOJ's position that amended section 2 requires the "maximization" of minority voting
strength).
13752001]
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branch, what will they do instead? Trying to anticipate how the chips
will fall here may well give redistricters fits in the next round. 3
Finally, jurisdictions will struggle with the (still unresolved)
problem of how to comply with section 2 without running afoul of the
Equal Protection Clause, as interpreted in Shaw v. Reno and its
progeny. Here, the timing of the 2000 census data's release will
complicate things. The only data from the 2000 census that will be
made available to the states in time for redistricting will be the data
on total population, voting age population, and race and ethnicity.
54
The additional information from the census short form, such as
owner/renter status, will not be released until the fall of 2001,55 and
the detailed socioeconomic data from the long form will not be
released until 20025 6-well after the 2001 round of redistricting must
be completed. Absent this additional demographic data, jurisdictions
that are required to consider race in designing their districts, in order
to comply with section 2 and/or section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,
will have difficulty convincing courts that they have not made it the
"predominant factor" in the process, triggering strict scrutiny under
Shaw.57
53. For some thoughts on how the multiple-race responses may complicate the
Gingles analysis in jurisdictions where there are a significant number of them, see Persily,
supra note 49, at 936-37; Nathaniel Persily, 2000 Census Data: New Format and New
Challenges, in THE REAL Y2K PROBLEM: CENSUS 2000 DATA AND REDISTRICrING
TECHNOLOGY 2,20-21 (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2000) [hereinafter Persily, New Format].
54. See U.S. Census Bureau, Strength in Numbers: Your Guide to Census 2000
Redistricting Data From the U.S. Census Bureau, available at http://www.census.gov/clol
www/strenghth2.pdf (issued July 2000) (describing the contents of the PL 94-171
Redistricting File) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Federal law requires
the PL 94-171 file to contain only the data on total population. See 13 U.S.C. § 141(c)
(1994). Since 1980, however, the Bureau has, at the request of the DOJ and the state
legislatures, also included the race and ethnicity data. See U.S. Census Bureau, supra at 5.
Since 1990, it has included data on voting age population as well. Id.
55. This information will appear in "Summary File 2," which will be released to the
states beginning in September of 2001. U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Data Products
At a Glance (2000), available at http:llwww.census.govlpopulationlwwwlcensusdatal
c2kproducts.html (last modified Apr. 16, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
56. This information will appear in "Summary File 3," which will be released
beginning in June of 2002. See id.
57. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 967 (1996) (plurality opinion) (holding that in
considering whether the state made race the "predominant factor" in the linedrawing
process, it is "evidentially significant" that the racial data compiled was "more detailed"
than the data it claimed to have used to identify non-racial "communities of interest");
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (holding that the strict scrutiny of Shaw applies
whenever the state has used race as the "predominant factor" in drawing a district's lines).
For further discussion of this problem, see Persily, supra note 49, at 938-44; Persily, New
Format, supra note 52, at 20. The only way out of this dilemma will be to look to sources
other than the census for non-racial demographic data. See Persily, supra note 49, at 942-
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III.
To a proponent of colorblind districting, there is a simple
solution to these difficulties: The Court should abandon Gingles,
declare amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional,
and forbid all consideration of race and ethnicity in drawing district
lines. This would discourage the racial and ethnic minority groups
that currently enjoy special protection under the Voting Rights Act
from pursuing a strategy of political separatism, and force them to
assimilate themselves into the existing political power structure, just
as other minority groups-the Germans, the Irish, the Italians, and
the Poles, to name a few-have done in the past. This solution to the
problem of minority representation, which we might call the "melting
pot" solution, is intuitively attractive to many Americans-at least to
many white Americans, and it seems to be where the Supreme Court
is currently headed, albeit not as quickly as Everett would like.
8
I wonder, though, whether this solution will continue to
command so much support from the white majority as demographic
change renders it just another minority. If historical experience is any
guide, I suspect the answer will be no.
History teaches us that when a group that has long enjoyed a
comfortable electoral majority-be it defined by race, class, partisan
affiliation, or some combination thereof-begins to feel its power
eroding because of demographic changes in the electorate, it tends to
try to beat back the threat and preserve its own dominance in one of
two ways. The first is to try to prevent the would-be usurpers from
participating in the political process. This is how upper- and
middle-class whites in the South responded in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century, when they felt their traditional political
dominance threatened by the enfranchisement of thousands of new
black and poor white voters. They engaged in a concerted effort to
prevent all of these groups from voting, through adoption of literacy
tests and other stiff new restrictions on the franchise, burdensome
voting procedures, fraudulent administration of the election laws, and
sheer physical intimidation.59 And it is how upper- and middle-class
44. For a discussion of some of the possible sources of this data, see Lisa Handley, A
Guide to 2000 Redistricting Tools and Technology, in THE REAL Y2K PROBLEM, supra
note 53, at 30-31. For a thoughtful discussion of some of the difficulties that jurisdictions
will encounter if they attempt to use non-census data to design their districting plans, see
Persily, Color by Numbers, supra note 49, at 943-44.
58. The Shaw cases are certainly a move in this direction, though some members of
the Shaw majority are clearly willing to move faster than others. Compare Bush, 517 U.S.
at 958, with id. at 999-1000 (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Scalia, J.).
59. For extensive accounts of this campaign, see ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT
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whites in our Northern and Midwestern cities responded in the same
era, when they felt their traditional political dominance threatened by
new waves of immigrant voters who were affiliating themselves with
the Democratic Party: They enacted rigid new registration
procedures designed to prevent these new voters from participating.
60
The second (and decidedly more benign) reaction is to try to
change the voting rules, replacing the traditional single-member
district plurality system of voting with some other sort of voting
system that does a better job of ensuring that minority interests are
able to win seats in the legislatures. This is what happened in
England in the nineteenth century, when upper-class elites suddenly
found themselves a minority in the electorate, thanks to the extension
of the vote to the lower classes: They attempted to install a system of
proportional representation in Parliament. 61 It is what happened in
South Carolina during Reconstruction, when whites suddenly found
themselves a minority in the electorate, thanks to the Fifteenth
Amendment's extension of the franchise to blacks, who constituted
over sixty percent of the state's population: They sought to install a
system of cumulative voting in elections for state and local legislative
bodies.62 And it is what happened in South Africa in 1994, when
white Afrikaners saw that they would soon become a minority in the
electorate, thanks to the proposed enfranchisement of the black
population: They demanded a system of proportional representation
in the national legislature.63
As demographic changes in the American electorate threaten the
TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 105-16
(2000); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE
RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910, at 45-
62 (1974); MICHAEL PERMAN, STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY: DISFRANCHISEMENT IN THE
SOUTH, 1888-1908, at 11 (2001).
60. For an account of this effort, see FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A.
CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS STILL DON'T VOTE AND WHY POLITICIANS WANT IT
THAT WAY 86-93 (2000).
61. KATHLEEN L. BARBER, A RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION: PROPORTIONAL
ELECTION SYSTEMS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 10, 12-16 (2000).
62. 1L at 22. The proposed reform was never adopted, because the state legislature
was already controlled by black Republicans. Id. Once military Reconstruction was over,
however, white Democrats, though still a numerical minority, were able to regain control
by disenfranchising blacks. Id. at 23. For more on this incident, see RICHARD ZUCZEK,
STATE OF REBELLION: RECONSTRUCTION IN SOUTH CAROLINA (1996).
63. See Paul Taylor, De Klerk Rebuffs Charge That He Gave in to Blacks, WASH.
POST, Nov. 23, 1993, at A31; Paul Taylor, South African Black, White Leaders Agree on
New Charter, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1993, at Al; Paul Taylor, South Africans Near
Agreement on Power-Sharing, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1993, at A24. For more on the
compromise embodied in South Africa's 1994 constitution, see Peter N. Levenberg, South
Africa's New Constitution: Will It Last?, 29 INTL. LAWY. 633, 638-41 (1995).
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long-standing political dominance of non-Hispanic whites,64 will we
see them reacting in a similar fashion? I expect so. Indeed, there are
already signs of this on the horizon. Take, for example, what
happened in California in the 1990s. During that decade, the racial
and ethnic composition of California's population changed
dramatically, as growth in the state's Latino and Asian populations
dwarfed that of its non-Hispanic white population.61 The white
majority reacted by using the citizens' initiative process to pass
several measures designed to preserve its traditional social, economic,
and political dominance.66 While none of these measures dealt
directly with the franchise, they were certainly designed, at least in
part, to keep Latinos and Asians from participating effectively in the
state's political process.67
64. The Census Bureau projects that whites will become a minority in this country
during the second half of this century. See, e.g., U.S. Census Bureau, Projections of the
Resident Population by Race, Hispanic Origin, and Nativity: Middle Series, 2050 to 2070, at
http:lwww.census.gov/populationlprojections/nationlsummary/np-t5-g.pdf (last visited
May 14,2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Demographers predict that
by 2025, ten states-California, Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, and Texas-will become what they call "melting pot" states, in
which no single racial or ethnic group has a majority. See Gregory Rodriguez, Candidates'
Racial Views Outdated, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5,2000, at M1 (citing work of William H. Frey).
California became a majority-minority state last year, as the non-Hispanic white
population dipped to just under 50%. See William Booth, California Minorities Are Now
the Majority: Non-Hispanic Whites Dip Below 50%, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2000, at A01.
By contrast, demographers expect the remaining forty states to remain largely white. See
Stuart Silverstein, U.S. Dividing Into Immigrant Zones, Report Contends, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 9,2000, at A33. For more on this important new demographic divide, see William H.
Frey, Multiple Melting Pots, WORLD AND I, May 2000, at 36; William H. Frey, New
Demographic Divide in the US: Immigrant and Domestic "Migrant Magnets," THE PUBLIC
PERsPECrIVE, June-July 1998, at 38; William H. Frey, Emerging Demographic
Balkanization: Toward One America or Two?, PSC Research Report No. 97-410 (Nov.
1997).
65. See MARK BALDASSARE, CALIFORNIA IN THE NEW MILLENIUM: THE
CHANGING SOCIAL AND POLITICAL LANDSCAPE 2-3,101-03 (2000). The growth in the
Latino and Asian populations has been fueled largely by immigration and by differential
birth rates. Id at 2-3, 102-03. The state's demographers now estimate that Latinos will
outnumber non-Hispanic whites sometime in the 2020s, and that Latinos will actually
become a majority in the 2040s. Id. at 3 & 101 tbl.4-1. (citing a 1998 California
Department of Finance report).
66. See Baldassarre, supra note 65, at 99 (citing Proposition 187, passed in 1994, which
restricted public services for illegal immigrants; Proposition 209, passed in 1996, which
ended affirmative action at the state and local level; and Proposition 227, passed in 1998,
which limited bilingual education in the public schools). For more on the racial and ethnic
undertones of these initiatives, see LYDIA CHAVEZ, THE COLOR BIND: CALIFORNIA'S
BATTLE TO END AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1998); DALE MAHARIDGE, THE COMING
WHITE MINORITY: CALIFORNIA'S ERUPTIONS AND AMERICA'S FUTURE (1996); PETER
SCHRAG, PARADISE LOST: CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCE, AMERICA'S FUTURE (1998).
67. Ironically, these initiatives seem to have touched off increased political
participation by Latinos. See BALDASSARRE, supra note 65, at 109-111 & 111 tbl.4-4.
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For another example, take what is alleged to have happened in
Florida, one of the ten states in which whites are likely to lose their
majority status in the near future, in the last presidential election.
Across the state, there were allegations that white Republicans had
attempted to keep African Americans, Haitians, and non-Cuban
Hispanics from voting, through such familiar techniques as purging
them from the voting lists just prior to the election, having the police
harass or intimidate them on their way to the polls, moving polling
places without notifying them, demanding that they produce
identification or prove that they were not convicted felons before
being allowed to vote, falsely representing to them that they were not
on the voting lists, and simply refusing to let them cast ballots. 68 The
parallel between this behavior and that of white Democrats in North
Carolina in the last quarter of the nineteenth century is manifest
Finally, think of the great hue and cry raised in the wake of last
year's presidential election about the unfairness of using winner-take-
all elections to select a state's presidential electors.69 True, some of
this came from academics who had long been hostile to winner-take-
all systems.7 ° But much of it came from average citizens, who had
never had much occasion to reflect seriously on the issue before,
because they themselves had never really born the brunt of the
winner-take-all system, at least not enough to make them stand up
and take notice.7" The outcome that has seemed so outrageous to
68. See, e.g., Noah Bierman, U.S. Rights Probe of Florida Voting Aims At Governor,
PALM BEACH POST (Palm Beach, Fla.), Jan. 7, 2001, at 1A; Robert E. Pierre & Carol
Morello, Irregularities Cited in Fla. Voting: Blacks Say Faulty Machines, Poll Mistakes
Cost Them Their Ballots, WASH. POST, Dec. 12,2000, at A38; Deborah Sharp, Some Black
Voters Say Election Excluded Them, USA TODAY, Dec. 8, 2000, at 8A; Peter Slevin &
Serge F. Kovaleski, Outside Palm Beach, Complaints Growing: Democratic Hotline
Collects 6,000 Reports of Problems Voting in Florida, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2000, at A12;
see also Farrell & Johnson, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1215, 1237-40, 1251 tbl. 3 (2001). For a more
complete account of these allegations, see U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Draft Report
on Voting Irregularities in Florida During the 2000 Presidential Election, available at
http:l/www.usccr.gov/vote2OO0/stdraftl/main.htm (June 8, 2001) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
69. At present, all but two states-Maine and Nebraska-use such a system to select
their presidential electors. See William Josephson & Beverly J. Ross, Repairing the
Electoral College, 22 J. LEGIS. 145, 160 & n.98 (1996); Beverly J. Ross & William
Josephson, The Electoral College and the Popular Vote, 12 J.L. & POL. 665, 667 n.1 (1996).
70. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, How To Make Every Vote Count, NEWARK STAR-
LEDGER, Nov. 19, 2000, at 001; Lani Guinier, Making Every Vote Count, THE NATION,
Dec. 4, 2000, at 5 [hereinafter Guinier, Making Every Vote Count]; Lani Guinier,
Proportional Representation: First Step in Election Reform, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 19,2000, at B4.
71. See, e.g., Letters to the Times, Electoral College: Change or Remove It?, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 13, 2000, at B6; Letters to the Editor, The Long Count Gets Longer, WASH.
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these individuals-that a presidential candidate who garners only
50.1% of the popular vote in a state can win its entire slate of electors,
leaving a competitor who wins 49.9% with none of them-is precisely
the same as the one that the racial and ethnic minorities, protected by
the Voting Rights Act, have faced for years under geographic
districting schemes in which the plurality winner takes all. 2 This
time, however, the winner-take-all system operated to render
"irrelevant" the votes of many members of the traditional white
majority, who are not accustomed to having their interests ignored in
elections-white Democrats in North Carolina, white Republicans in
Michigan, and white Republicans in New Mexico. Now that these
individuals are feeling the pinch of the winner-take-all system
themselves, they are beginning to reconsider their long-standing
affection for it.
In the new America, this experience will be repeated many times
over, as non-Hispanic whites who have enjoyed comfortable majority
status for centuries suddenly find themselves just another minority.
Will these changes cause Everett and other like-minded individuals to
change their tune about the "melting pot" solution to the problem of
minority representation? Given the strong tendency of principle to
take a back seat to self-interest in matters political, I suspect they will.
For this reason, Lani Guinier may well be right when she says that the
aftermath of Election 2000 offers us a once in a generation
opportunity to rethink our approach to the problem of minority
representation in this country.73
POST, Dec. 9,2000, at A28; Letters to the Editor, Reforming the Electoral College, WASH.
POST, Dec. 24, 2000, at B6.
72. If anything, the arguments for a plurality winner-takes-all rul6 seem somewhat
stronger in elections for presidential electors than in elections for seats in legislatures.
While we are nominally choosing members of a "representative" body (the electoral
college), that body is not, as currently structured, a deliberative one, and its sole purpose is
to choose a single executive who will represent the entire country. In this context, there is
arguably a greater need for consensus. See JUDITH A. BEST, THE CHOICE OF THE
PEOPLE?: DEBATING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 10-12 (1996).
73. See Guinier, Making Every Vote Count, supra note 70.
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